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EDITORIAL.
MOOT COURT.
A reader of the FORUM will notice that
a large part of the space of the publication
is devoted to reporting the cases of the
Moot Court of the school. At the Dickinson School of Law particular stress is
laid upon the work of the students in the
Mfoot Court and the students themselves
enter into the preparation and trial of the
cases with an enthusiasm that always
makes the case interesting and beneficial
to all concerned. At n6 other Law School
do we believe are better facilities offered
for work along this line. Taking into
consideration the cases tried in the courts
of the two societies, very often as many as
seven cases a week are tried in the various
courts of the school. That this branch of
the work is beneficial none will dispute
and with the zeal with which it is entered
into by the students and the spirit displayed at the trials, all the advantages
that this method of instruction possesses
are grasped by those participating in the
trials. Many of the prominent jurists
of the state have commented favorably
on the work of our Moot Court as reported in the FORUM. The trials are
open to the student body and whoever
might wish to attend them. The foot
Court has been beneficial in giving the
students a practical knowledge of the
law and in teaching them to use the

knowledge they acquire in the recitation
room. We desire to call this part of the
work to the attention of all who are con
templating a law school course, for we feel
sure that at no other school will they find
better Afoot Court advantages. A splendid
working library supplements the foot
Court work.
The management of the FORUM requests
the students to carefully examine the advertising columns of the FORUM when
about to make any purchases. Those who
have placed advertisements in the FORUM
are all reliable business men and deserve
the patronage ofthe student body inasmuch
as they have patronized us. One good
turn deserves another.
PRIZES.
The Dean of the Law School offers two
prizes, consisting of useful law books. The
first is to the Middler who shall furnish
the best briefs in the cases tried in the moot
court, for the January-June term, 1898.
Those who intend to compete must signify
this purpose at the beginning of the term.
The briefs of the competitors will be pre-

served for comparison at the end of the
term. The name of the captor of the prize
will be announced at the commencement
exercises.
A prize is offered by the dean to that
member of the Junior class that shall do
the best work in the law of Real Property.
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Students intending to compete must state
their purpose at the beginning of the term.
The prize offered by the Edward Thompson Company, consisting of the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, in 15 to 18
volumes, will be awarded to the gentleman
of the Middle classthat produces the best
essay on Sales of Land in the Orphans'
Court exclusive of sales in partition. A
competent and impartial judge or judges
will be selected and the essays submitted
to them. Competitors must notify the dean
of their purpose to compete within two
weeks after the opening of the next term.
The essays must be delivered to the dean
not later than May 1st, 1898.

THE SOCIETIES.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
The last month is one of which the
members of the Allison Law society can
look back upon with pride. At no time
in its history has better work been done
by its members. At its moot courts, it has
had the services of three of the leading attorneys of the Cumberland county bar,
and when the society received of two of
them promises of lectures for the near future, the society felt itself fortunate indeed.
Arthur R. Rupley, Dist. Atty. for Cumberland county, sat as Judge in one of the
cases, where the issue was the right of onewho had purchased a ticket to a theater
and had been ejected. Messrs. MeMeans
and Capwell represented the plaintiff, and
Messrs. Landis and Freed appeared for the
defendant. Mr. Rupley reserved his decision and in a few days handed down an
elaborate opinion, elucidating the law of
the case in every particular. Mr. Rupley's
courtesies in his official capacity are much
appreciated by the student body, and his
promise of a lecture evidenced the interest
he has taken in the school.
A question of the negligence of street
railways was presided over by J. W. Wetzel, Esq. The case was ably argued for
the plaintiff in error by Messrs. Daniels
and Reese, while the interests of the defendant were looked after by Messrs.

Charles Moyer and Charles Weeks. Mr.
Wetzel is one of the leaders of the bar of
the state, being an officer of the State Bar
Association, and the society was fortunate
to have as a Judge a railroad attorney
who has tried many such cases. His decision rendered after the close of the argument was, in fact, an able lecture on the"
law of negligence. Mr. Wetzel's promise
to deliver a lecture during the winter was
the signal for an outburst of applause and
enthusiasm.
The last case tried was presided over by
W. W. Fletcher, Esq., of the Cumberland
county bar. The question at issue was
the validity of a labor claim. The plaintiff
was represented by Messrs. W. K. Schissler
and H. M. Sypherd, Messrs. J. 0. Hass
and J. P. Wood representing the defendant. Judge Fletcher reserved his decision. The thanks of the society was ten
dered him by President G. H. Moyer.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Law Society held a short
meeting on November 19th. No programme had been arranged on account of
the lecture delivered later in the evening
by Judge McClure to the student body.
The opinion of the court in the case tried
at the preceding regular meeting was
handed down before adjournment.
W. J. Shearer, Esq., well known as a
member of the Cumberland county bar,
lectured to the school at the invitation of
the Dickinson Society on November 26th.
His presentation of the principles and intricacies of "Criminal Practice" was illustrated by numerous cases drawn from his
own celebrated practice. From beginning
to end, Mr. Shearer emphasized the great
duty of an attorney to his client in defending criminal prosecutions. After his delightful talk, on motion of the society,
President Duffy extended the appreciative
thanks of all present.
On December 3d, the regular order of
society work was varied by the debate:
"Resolved, That the Cause of the South
was Justifiable." The able arguments of
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Messrs. Pepper and Herr, for the affirmative, and Messrs. Laubenstein and Aubrey
for the negative caused a division of opinion among thejudges, I essrs. Sullivan and
Miller deciding in favor of the latter, while
Mr. Radle favored the former. After
President Duffy had called on a number
of members to speak extempore on subjects which he assigned, the meeting was
adjourned.

The College Glee Club and Orchestra
gavean entertainment before the Teacher's
Institute, Tuesday evening, Nov. 30th,
which was thoroughly enjoyed by the large
audience present.
Within the past few weeks they have
given concerts at Shippensburg and Greencastle. During the Christmas holidays a
tour of the western part of the State will
be made.

At the regular meeting of the Dickinson
Law Society on Decembef 10th, thirty-five
members being present, the following officers were elected: President, Thomas B.
Pepper; Vice-President, Miss Julia Midle;
Secretary, George W. Aubrey; Treasurer,
Frank T. Morrow; Sergeant-at-Arms,
Frank J. Laubenstein; Prothonotary,
Llewellyn Hildreth; Recorder, William
M. Flannigan; Register, Walter J. Henry;
Justice of the Peace, B. Johnston McEwen;
Sheriff, Origen G. McCandless; District
Attorney, Isaiah Scheeline.

Last week, R. W. Capwell, '98, was confined to his room with illness for several
days.
The members of the Junior class in Criminal Law have been assigned subjects by
Judge Sadler, on which they are required
to write theses, the excellence of which
will determine in a measure the standing
of each student in that branch of the law.

THE SCHOOL.

OurPresident, Geo. Edward Reed, D.D.,
LL. D., has gone to Old Point Comfort for
his health. We are glad to learn that he
he is improving rapidly and expects soon
to be able to resume his duties.

Christmas.
Vacation.
Farewell to Blackstone et. al. for three
weeks.
D. Edward Long and D. D. Lewis have
entered the Junior Class since the opening
of the term. J. C. Smith, '97, hasreturned
to school and is taking post graduate work.
S. B. Hare, '98, has been elected Vice
President of the Dickinson College Athletic
Association,
Frank B. Sellers, Jr., spent Thanksgiving in Mercersburg.
P. E. Radle, '98, and A. Frank John, '99,
attended a meeting of Camp 15, Sons of
Veterans at Harrisburg Nov. 23rd.
Among~the students who accompanied
the Dickinson foot-ball team on its victorious trip to Sunbury were Robert W. Irving, Merkel Landis, prank B. Sellers, Jr.,
Eli Saulsbury and Blake Irvin.

Examinations are now occupying the
thought of the students to the exclusion of
everything else. The monotonous drone
of the grind is heard in the land.

The Middle Class after a very exciting
contest elected the following officers, Friday, Dec. 10:
President-Fred B. Moser.
Vice President-G. F. Vowinckle.
Secretary-Edwin G. Hutchinson.
Treasurer-A. T. Morgan.
Historian-Samuel B. Hare.
Sergeant-at-Arms-Claude L. Roth.
In order to bear public record to the
esteem in which J. Herman Bosler, Esq.,
a notice of whose death appeared in our
last issue, was held by the students of the
Dickinson School of Law, the following
resolution was adopted by the students and
has been presented to the FoRum for publication :
Resolved, That in the death of J. Herman
Bosler, Esq., one of the original incorporators, the Dickinson School of Law has
lost a warm friend and one whose absence
will be keenly felt. And we, the students
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of the school do hereby desire to publicly
express our appreciation of Mr. Bosler's
assistance to the school, our high regard
for his sterling character, our sincere regret at his death and our deep sympathy
with his family upon their great affliction.
In the name of the school,
BLAKE IRVIN,
CHAS. E. DANIELS,
F. B. SELLERS, JR.

ALUMNI

PERSONALS.

Charles W. Hamilton, Esq., of the class
of 1897, a member of the Pittsburg bar, reports that he is "getting along very well."
He has had something to keep him "busy
nearly all the time."

THE MOOT COURT.
JOHN POWERS vs. WILLIAM SAN'DERSON.
Trespass.

J. C. Walker, '97, was admitted to practice at the Bar of Newcastle County,
Delaware.
Isaac I. Wingert, '97, has been admitted to the Franklin County Bar.
Rufus Lincoln, '96, G. Grant Clever,
'95, and Henry W. Savidge, '97, helped
cheer Dickinson on to victory in the great
game with State, Thanksgiving Day, at
Sunbury.
W. H. Stamey, '96, is interested in the
establishment of silk mills at Reynoldsville, Pa.
J. S. Omwake, '96, who is progressing
in the profession, is counsel for the Boro.
of Shippensburg.
Saml. C. Boyer, '93, is superintending
the construction of water works at Dushore, Pa.
J. Austin Schmidt, of Hazleton, a member of last year's Junior class, is now
studying law in the offices of Wheaton,
Darling and Woodward in Wilkes-Barre.
Geo. B. Somerville, '97, paid a short
visit to Carlisle and the Law school recently, and gives a very favorable report
of his progress since graduation.
We congratulate Rush Trescott, of the
class of 1895, upon his appointment as
Assistant District Attorney for the important county of Luzerne.

ANDREW SHOENER, HUGH K.

MILLER

and Ro0BERT H. BARKER for the plaintiff.

An innkeeper is responsible for the property of his guest lost by acts of servants or
other guests.-Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92;
Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262; Duncan v.
Barr, 21 Pitt. L. J. 102; Sneider v. Geiss,
1 Yeates 34 ; Jeoffards v. Crump, 5 W. N.
C. 10; Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376;
Act May 7, 1855.
ROBERT W. IRVING, BLAKE IRVIN and
ALFRED J. FEIGHT for defendant.

Landlord's liability does not extend to
robbery.-2 Kent. Com., p. 593. Intoxication or any other contributory negligence
is a good defence.-Walsh v. Porterfield,
87 Pa. 376; Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 274;
Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y. 115; Bendetson v. French, 46 N. Y. 270; Cutler v.
Bonney, 30 Mich. 260; Towanda Coal Co.
v. Heeman, 86 Pa. 418.
STATEMKENT OF CASE.

William Sanderson is the owner and
keener of a hotel located in the village of
Newburg, Cumberland County. On the
14th day of July, 1897, James Powers from
Baltimore, Maryland, registered as a guest
at this hotel and engaged boarding and
lodging for three weeks. Hearrived about
noon of the said day and was at once assigned to a room on the second floor. In
the afternoon of that day he drank liquor
to excess and became intoxicated. He. retired to his room late that night and failed
to lock the door. He had in his clothing
one hundred dollars in money and a gold
watch of the value of seventy-five dollars.
During the night his room was entered
and the money and watch taken. The
thief was a servant of the proprietor of the
hotel. Can Powers recover from Sanderson the loss he sustained, to wit, one hundred and seventy-five dollars.
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PER CURIAM.

The defendant in this case is an innkeeper, and the plaintiff was his guestthe money and watch of the latter were
stolen by the servants of the former. The
keeper of a hotel or inn becomes the insurer of the goods of the guest to whom
entertainment is given for reward.
"An innkeeper, like a common carrier,
is an insurer of the goods of his guest."2 Kent Com. 594. "He is practically an
insurer of the safety of the property of a
guest while he remains in his house."Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. St. 376.
"An innkeeper is an insurer of the goods
of his guest and is bound to keep them safe
from burglars within and without."Mateer v. Brown, 1 Bennett (Cal.) 229.
"The Common Law, on grounds of public policy, for the protection of travellers
imposes an extraordinary liability upon an
innkeeper for the goods of his guest." 11
A. & E. Ency. 51 p.
"An innkeeper holds out a general invitation to all travellers to come to his house
and receives a reward for hospitality, and
the Law in return imposes upon him corresponding duties, one of which is, to protect the property of those whom he receives
as guests." Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns.
175.
"To render an innkeeper liable it is not
necessary to prove that the goods of the
guest were delivered to his special keeping
nor to prove negligence on his part." Clute
v. Wiggins, supra.
"The goods of the guest being within the
inn the innkeeper will be charged with
liability in case of loss." McDonald v.
Edgerton, 5 Barb. 560; Norcross v. Norcross, 55 Me. 164; House v. Tully, 62 Pa.
St. 92.
"An innkeeper is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in preserving the
property of his guests, committed to his
care, when they have complied with all
reasonable rules of the inn." Adams v.
Clem, 41 Ga. 65-67.
"He can only absolve himself from liability for the loss of goods or property of
his guest by showing affirmatively that
the loss was not attributable to any fault
or want of care on part of himself or his
servants." Metealfv. Hess, 14 1ll. 129.

"The proprietor of a tavern is bound even
to see that those who enter it are properly
protected from assaults or insults." Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. St. 582.
"The responsibility of the innkeeper extends to all his servants and domestics."
Schultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. St. 273. "He is
bound to provide honest and faithful servants." House v. Tully, supra.
"It is the duty of the innkeeper to provide honest servants, and keep honest inmates, and to exact care and vigilance
over all persons who may come into his
house." John v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118.
"The liability of the innkeeper is not
diminished but rather increased by the
fact that the guest is intoxicated to such a
degree as not to be able to take care of himself.' '-Ruhnstein v. Cruikshanks,54 Mich.
199.
Powers therefore had a right to expect
that the defendant's employees were honest. He was under no obligation, in the
absence of a request on the part of the defendant, to lock his door. The act of 7
May, 1855, P. L. 479, relating to innkeepers has no effect upon the present case. It
is not referred to in the statement of facts
and its protection can only be invoked by
an innkeeper when it affirmatively appears
that there has been a strict compliance
with its provisions on his part, which requires the providing of a safe, the posting
of notices, etc.
His intoxicated condition did not modify
the duty or alter the liability of Sanderson.
He had a right, drunk or sober, awake orsleeping, to be protected from pillage by
his host and by his employees. Sanderson,
the defendant, had invited Powers in common with the public in general, to come to
his hotel and he has become an iisurer for
the safety of the property which he might
have on his person. The defendant is the
guarantor of the honesty of his employees.
Any adjudicated cases which seem at variance with the conclusions arrived at by
us will be found to be determinations where
contentions arose between boarders and
boarding-house keepers and not between
innkeepers and guests.
The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover in the present case and judgment is
directed to be entered in his favor and
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against the defendant, William Sanderson,
for one hundred and seventy-five dollars
and costs of suit.
W. F. SADLER, P. J.

other hand that it had been executed by
accident or mistake or through fraudulent
representations.
It was not the intention of the plaintiff
to actually buy nor of the defendants to
actually sell any grain. The dealings were
between the plaintiff and the defendants
FRANK G. DRAKE -vs. GEORGE ANalone. "The parties were not dealing in
DREWS & CO.
stocks (wheat) but in margins." Ruchizky
v. De Haven, 97 Pa. 209.
Assumpsit.
"The form of a wagering contract is imBLAKE IRVIN and HUGu MILLER for
material if both parties understand that
the plaintiff.
one shall not be bound to deliver and the
1. Written agreement cannot be altered
other not bound to take and pay the
by parol.- Baugh's Exrs. v. White, 161
price, but that a settlement is to be made
Pa. 638; Wodock v. Robbinson, 148 Pa.
503; N. & W. Branch R. R. v. Swank, 105
between the contract price and the market
Pa. 561.
price." Harvey etal. v. Merrill etal., 5 L.
2. The transaction was legitimate.R. A. 200.
Smi~p v. Bouvier, 70 Pa. 325; Maxton v.
Gheen, 75 Pa. 166; Stewart v. Parnell, 147
"A transaction in stocks by way of marPa. 523; Brua's Appeal, 55 Pa. 299; Peters
gin; settlement of differences and payment
v. Grimm, 149 Pa. 163.
3. The principal can recover both mar- of gain or loss, without intending to deliver the stocks, is a mere wager, which
gins and profits.-Peters v. Grim, 149
Pa. 163: Repplier v. Jacobs, 149 Pa. 167;
the law does not sanction and will not
McNaughton v. Haldeman, 160 Pa. 144;
carry into effect." Waugh v. Beck, 114 P.
Hart v. Girard Bor., 63 Pa. 388; Evans on
8. 422.
Principal and Agent, 287; Huffcut on
"A contract of sale, for future delivery
Agency, 117.
is binding, unless shown that both parties
ROBT. W. IRVING, ANDREW S. SHOENER
and ROBT. H. BARKER for the defendant.
intended that there should be no delivery
1. Drake acted as principal and not as
but only a settlement of differences beagent. -Ruchizky v. De Haven, 97 Pa.
tween the contract and market price."
202.
2. Ifdelivery was not intended, plaintiff North v. Phillips, 89 P. S. 256; Dickson v.
Thomas, 97 P. S. 288. When there is
cannot recover.-Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa.
163; Fareira v. Gabell,.89 Pa. 89; Waugh v.
any dispute about the facts, "it is the
Beck, 114 Pa. 422; Maxton v. Gheen, 75
province of the jury to determine the naPa. 166.
ture of the transaction and to ascertain the
PER CURIAM.
intention of the parties."
Fareira v.
It appears by the case, as stated, that
Gabell, 89 Pa. 89 ; Peters v. Grim, 149
the defendants gave to the plaintiff a rePa. 163. In the case stated however the
ceipt for the money paid them by the lat- intention of the parties appears as one of
ter, at the head of which was the printed
the admitted facts. While the later cases
statement that "actual delivery is in all
of Peter v. Grim supra, Rlepplier v.
cases understood." Conceding, that in the Jacobs, 149 Pa. 167; McNaughton & Co. v.
absence of any explanation, this might
Haldeman,160 Pa. 144;Hopkinsv. O'Kane
have been properly regarded as evidence
169 Pa. 478, Champlin v. Smith. 164 Pa.
that a contract for the actual delivery of
481, and Albertson v. Laughlin, 173 Pa.
the grain was contemplated and entered
52.5, seem to somewhat modify the rullngs
into, yet we have the admission of both
in Fareira v. Gabell, supra, and Ruchizky
parties to the contract that such was not
v. De Haven, supra,holding that "a purtheir understanding.
"That neither of
chase of stock for speculation, even when
them had any such intention."
done merely on margin, is not necessarily
The present case does not involve such
a gambling transaction," yet the doctrine
a contention as would have arisen, had it
is strictly ddhered to, that if there was.
been insisted, on the one hand, that the not under any circumstances to be a dewriting contained the only and full under- livery, as part of, and completing a purstanding of the parties, and urged on the chase, then the transaction is a mere
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wager" and the law will not enforce such
contracts.
If Andrews & Co. had in fact been the
mere agents of the plaintiff and as such
had dealt with other parties and had
closed up transactions and reaped profits
which had been paid over to them, they
could not withhold the moneys from the
plaintiff on the ground that the transaction was unlawful and the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover the profits so received
and held by them.-Norton v. Blinn, 39
Oh. St. 145; Brook v. Martin, 59 U. S. 70.
But while the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover any of the profits of the transaction from the defendants he is entitled to
recover the margins which he deposited
with them. The transaction having been
closed they are in law bound to pay him
the margin, one hundred dollars. This is
expressly ruled by our supreme court in
Peters v. Grim and Repplier v. Jacobs,
supra. And now Dec. 2, 1897, judgment
is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants for the sum of
one hundred dollars and costs of suit.
W. F. SADLER, P. J.
FREDERICK CRITTENDEN vs. FARMERS' INS. CO.
Assumpsit.
FREDERICK C. MILLER and ALBERT T.
MORGAN for plaintiff.
1. Since the agent was aware of the circumstances, the company will be estopped
from denying that Crittenden has an insurable interest.-Bennet v. North British
Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 273.
2. The contractual relations entered into
by Crittenden give him an insurable interest.-Dohn v. Stork Ins. Co., 5 Lans.
275; McGivney v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.,
1 Wend. 85; Putnam v. Mercantile Ins.
Co., 5 Mete. 386.
The building of the house on a freehold
estate causes it to become a part of the
realty.-Tiedman on R. P., p. 84 ; Carver v.
Gough, 153 Pa., 225; Westgate v. Nixon,
128 Mass. 304.
This transaction is a sale.-Tiedman on
Sales, 87.
If plaintiff's interest had been fairly
made known to the agent at the time the
contract was made, he can maintain an
action.-Eenn v. New Orleans Ins. Co., 53
Ga. 578; Caston y- Monmouth Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 54 Me. i70.
W. LLoYD SNYDER and A. M. DEVALL
for defendant.

1. A policy of insurance obtained upon
a subject in which the insured has no interest, is void.-Sweeney v. Franklin Ins.
Co., 20 Pa. 337; Fowler v. N. Y. Ins. Co.,
26 N-. Y. 422.
In this case, the builder has an insurable interest.-Franklin Ins. Co. v. Coate,
14 Mo. 285; Protection Ins. Co. v. Hall, 15
(B) Mon. (Ky.) 411.
2 There must be a pecuniary interest in
the thing insured.-Rohrbach v. Germania
Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47; Tice v. Ziusser,
76 N. Y. 549.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Crittenden owning a lot contracted
with Joab Martin to erect a house upon it
for $4,000.00. No part of this sum was to
be paid until the completion of the house,
to the satisfaction of an architect. Shortly
after the construction commenced Crittenden procured an insurance from the defendant up to the sum of $3,000.00. The
damage was to be ascertained according to
the actual value of the property at the
time of any fire. After the house was up,
but before its completion it was destroyed
by a fire which devastated the neighborhood. The loss thus occasioned amounted
to $3,400. Immediately after the fire Joab
Martin began the process of re-erection,
which was continuing when the action
was brought by Crittenden.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
There are two facts which seem to have
awakened doubt of the right of Crittenden
to recover upon his policy of insurance. (1)
The policy was taken out upon a house
which was at the time inchoate, but as to
which, at every stage even to completion,
it was intended to be an indemnity, and
(2.) the plaintiff was to pay no money to
Martin, the contractor,' until the house
was finished, and therefore, it is said, its
destruction could be no pecuniary detriment to Crittenden.
(1.) The contract had been made for
the erection of the house and its erection
had recently begun, when the policy was
obtained. The house was about to come
into existence. We think it was a proper
subject of insurance. "Floating policies,"
"shifting risks" are well known to the
law. Policies may be taken out that insure, not simply goods owned by the assured at the time, but that shall be owned,
during the period of the policy. 7 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 1008. In Ellmaker v. Frank-
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lin Fire Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 133, a policy was
taken out on a house undergoing construction. A ship on the stocks was, in Hood
v. Manhattan Fire Ins. Co., 11 N. Y. 532,
insured, the policy attaching to it, at every
stage of its progress towards completion.
It has never been doubted so far as we are
at present advised, that if a house is insured, and subsequently, is increased in
value by improvement, the damage to
those portions of the house which were
added since the taking out of the insurance, would be covered by it. The builder
has an insurable interest in the house he
is building. 1 Biddle, Ins. 158; 11 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 317, and the policy though
it attaches when but a few dollars have been
expended upon it will continue to attach
to it, and to all the additions, until it has
cost thousands. We see nothing to prevent recovery on the policy in the circumstance that it was taken when the erection
of the house had barely started.
(2.) Difficulty seems to be felt, on the
part of the defendant, because the house
was erected at the exclusive cost of the
contractor, Martin, until completed to the
satisfaction of an architect. It follows, it
is contended, that if the building before
completion was destroyed by fire, the loss
would fall, not on Crittenden, but on Martin. It cannot be doubted that, had such
fire occurred, Martin would have been
bound to rebuild for the contract price,
and toties quoties. The owner could not
be compelled to pay anything to him, until the house was fully built. Tompkins
v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272; Superintendent
of Public Schools v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L.
513; 1 Biddle, Ins. 159.
But does it follow that Crittenden could
suffer no loss from the destruction of the
building? We think not. The value of
the building is not necessarily equivalent
to the contract price. It may exceed that
price. The house may be worth more to
Crittenden than the money that he must
pay. Retention of the money would
then not be as advantageous to him as
parting with it and gaining the house.
But, it may be said, he may not only retain the money, if the house is not built,
but recover damages for Martin's failure
to build it, and the right persists, even
after the destruction of the house by fire.

But, Martin's continued solvency is not
certain. It might be more beneficial to
Crittenden to have the house than to have
the personal responsibility only of Martin
for damages. Again, Martin, after making some progress with the building,
might abandon it. In that case, Crittenden would own, without paying for it,
whatever had been attached to his soil.
This possibility had a value, which was insurable. Foley v. Manufacturers Fire Ins.
Co., 152 N. Y. 131.
It may be urged that, if Crittenden may
recover the insurance, and, at the same
time, compel Martin to re-construct
the house, he profits by the fire. That result would follow, unless in some way,
Martin should be subrogated to his right,
as to the insurance money if he should reerect the building. We do not decide that
he might be thus subrogated. It would
not follow, if he could not be, that Crittenden could not recover the insurance
money. It has been often decided that
the reception by one who has been injured
by X's negligence, of indemnity on an accident policy, is no bar to recovery from X,
for his negligence. So recovery from X
could not bar a recovery on the policy.
152 N. Y. 131.
We are of opinion therefore, that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant $3,000 with interest.
GEORGE KEMP vs. JOHN HEYMAN.
Assumpsit.
3. AUsTIN SULLIVAN and FRED.

B.
for the plaintiff.
1. An accommodation party paying the
instrument at maturity is entitled to be
subrogated to all the rights and securities
against the party accommodated, possessed
by the holder of the paper who has received
payment.-Vol. 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, 2 Ed. 371; Stevenson v. Anston, 3 Met.
474; Nat. Bank v. Shields, 55 Hun. 274;
Nat. Bank v. Wood, 71 N. Y. 405; Lenuox
v. Boat. 3 Wheat. 520 Moeser v. 6uswell,
150 Pa. 409; Benedict v. DeGroot, 1 Alb.
App. Dec. 532.
2. In a suit by the holder against the
maker of a negotiable note, the plaintiff
cannot be called on to prove the consideration unless fraud be shown.--Brown v.
Street, 6 W. & S. 221; Knight v. Pugh, 4
W. & S. 445.
PHILIP E. RADLE and SAMUEL B.HARE
for the defendant.
MOSER

THE FORUM.
Valuable consideration is essential to
every contract.-Clark on Contracts, 153.
The consideration of a promissory note
may be inquired into.-Ulement v. Reppard, 15 Pa. 111; Wheelock v. Leonard, 20
0a.
. No liability, according to the
doctrine of Altoona Bank v. Dunn, 151 Pa.
228.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Heyman owed $794 to Charles Kemp,
brother of George Kemp. George, desiring
to procure payment, spoke with Heyman
andasked him why he didnot pay Charles.
Heyman said he was unable to raise the
money. George Kemp then said that if
Heyman would make a note, he, George,
would endorse it, and that the money
could be thereon obtained from a bank.
He also said he would give to Heyman an
old wagon worth $18. Heyman made the
note, payable to George Kemp, who endorsed it to the discounting bank. The
money thus obtained was paid to Charles
Kemp. Subsequently George Kemp had
to pay the note to the bank. He never
delivered the wagon to Heyman. As payee
he sues Heyman, as maker of the note.
The liability of Heyman to Kemp is that
of the maker of a promissory note to the
payee. Primafacie, the payee may compel the maker to pay according to the
terms of the promise. The duty of paying
is denied by Hcyman because of the alleged
absence of a consideration. Was there a
consideration? The note was made as an
instrument for procuring money for Heyman. It was drawn by him, endorsed by
Kemp, and by Kemp handed back to Heyman. In Heyman's hands it did not represent any contract. But Heyman had it
discounted by the bank. In the money
received from the bank, was the considertion for Heyman's promise as maker and
of Kemp's promise as endorser. That act
subjected Kemp to a legal liability toward
the bank, and this liability was consideraation for the promise of Heyman to pay
him. Had there been no consideration
before, the payment of the note by Kemp
would have furnished one for the promise
of Heyman to him.
But, there were two inducements to
Heyman to make the note. One, evidently
was, the obtaining of money on it with
which to extinguish a debt to Charles
Kemp. The other was the obtaining of a

wagon from George. The latter alone,
would not have led to the making of the
note, nor probably, would the former. But,
the wagon has not been delivered by
Kemp,.the plaintiff. We are to consider
(1) whether his promise to deliver it was
binding on him, and (2) what if binding,
would be the consequence of the non-performance of it upon his right to recover
upon the note.
1. If the promise was not binding, it
was not binding because of a want of consideration for it.
No other defect is
suggested. It is urged that the act of
Heyman, which that promise induced, was
an act which he was already legally bound
to perform. He owed the debt to Charles
Kemp. The promise of George Kemp was
made to induce him to pay it. He ought
to have paid it without the promise. It
is probably true that a promise made by A
to B, to induce B, and in fact inducing B,
to discharge a debt to C, finds no consideration in the mere payment to C. "A
promise to do, (and consequently, the
doing,) what one is already bound to do is
not a consideration." 3 Am. and Eng.
Ency. of Law, (1st Ed.) 834; Clark Contracts, 189. If Heyman had simply promised to pay, or had simply paid Charles
Kemp, doubtless George Kemp's promise
to give him a wagon would have been
without consideration. But Heyman did
more than this. He put himself under
contractual obligations toward both George
Kemp and the discounting bank. It is
true that he did this, as a means of procuring the money with which to pay his
debt. He was under no legal duty to resort to this means. He chose to promise
to pay George Kemp $794, if by Kemp's
endorsement, he should procure $794 from
a bank, if Kemp should have to pay the
bank, and if Kemp would give him the
wagon. Kemp agreed to give both the
endorsement and the wagon. We think
the assumption of the obligation of paying
the bank, or George Kemp, consideration
enough for the promise of the wagon.
The fact that the ultimate object of the
transaction was the discharge ofHeyman's
debt, and was, in a sense a benefit to him,
does not take from the involution of himself in obligations toward the bank and
George Kemp, the capacity to serve as a
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consideration. Clark Cont. 150. We are
not able to adopt the view referred in
Avend v. Smith, 151 N. Y. 502, that in
giving the note Heyman did no more than
his duty, and therefore that he furnished
thereby no consideration for George
Kemp's promise.
2. George Kemp's promise to deliver
the wagon was binding upon him. What
is the consequence of his failure to deliver
it? Plainly the defendant is entitled to
deduct from the amount due on the note,
the value of the wagon, in respect to which
Judgment
he has been disappointed.
therefore will be entered for the face of
the note, with interest, less $18.

JAMES ROBERTS vs. RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Trespass.

W,4. A. JORDAN and FRANK T. MoRRow for plaintiff.
I. A. R. R. Co. is responsible for negligence, carelessness and want of skill of its
servants. P. R. R. Co. v. Keeler, 67 Pa.
:300; P. R. R. Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. 365.
A railroad company is bound to use the
greatest care and diligence with respect to
passengers. M1irer v. Pa. R. R. Co., 64 Pa.
225; N. Y. L. E. and W. R. R. Co. v.
Dougherty, 11 W. N. C. 437. The defendPa. R. R. Co. v.
ant was negligent.
Lyons, 129 Pa. 113; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Peters,
116 Pa. 206; Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v.
Webster, 18 W. N. C. 339. The brakeman's act conduced to Mr. Roberts' injury.
R. R. Co. v. Alfard, 128 Pa. 146. The
plaintiffwas a passenger. Am. & Eng.
Enc. of Law, pages 743 & 744. Plaintiff
was not negligent. Johnston v. West
Chester & Phila. R. R. Co. 70 Pa. 357;
Salter v. Utica & Black River R. R. Co.,
88 N. Y. 49; P. R. R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32
Pa. 292.
G. FRED VOWINCKEL for defendant.
The defendant company was not negligent. R. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147;
Del., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. A. E. Cadow,
120 Pa. 559; :Hagan v. Phila. & Grays
Ferry Ry. Co., 10 W. N. C. 360. The company is responsible only for the negligence
of its servants in the scope of their duties.
Mary Isaacs v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 47
N. Y. 122. The plaintiff was negligent.
Bradwell v. Pittsburg, etc. Pass. liy. Co.
139 Pa. 404; Hestonville, M[antua and
Fairmount P. R. R. Co. v. Gray, 3 W. N.
C. 421; Baconv. R. R. Co., 143 Pa. 14; Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186;
Butler v. R. R. Co., 126 Pa. 160.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the morning of July 12th at 10
o'clock, Roberts was at a station of the
defendant intending to take the train
shortly to arrive. At the approach of the
train, he descended to the ground, standing
close to the track. The train did not stop
but simply slowed, and conductor, seeing
Roberts, shouted to him to get on if he
wanted to, that the train would not stop.
It was then going at the rate of from one
to two miles per hour. There were three
steps to the car. Roberts gained the lowest step and advanced to the platformi, his
satchel, weighing 25 pounds, in his left
hand, and his right grasping the guard
rail. While there he was struck by a
brakeman who was hurrying from the
preceding car, and at the same time the
car gave a sudden lurch orjerk. Hereeled
in consequence, lost his hold, and fell
from the car, suffering a severe accident.
Defendants request the court to instruct
the jury:
1. Boarding train in motion is negligence
per se.
2. The brakeman's act not imputable to
defendant.
3. There was nonegligenceby defendant.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the JuryThe defendant requests us to instruct
you (1) that the boarding of the train by
Roberts was negligence per se; (2) that the
brakeman's act was not imputable to the
defendant, and (3) that the evidence does
not disclose any negligence by the defendant.
(1.) There is an infinite number of degrees of motion. Some are so slight, that
the boarding of a train when in such motion, could not be appreciably more hazardous than would boarding it, if at rest.
It is true that in Bacon v. R. R. Co., 143
Pa. 14, the attempt to board a train that
was moving at the rate of three to four,
or four to five miles per hour was denounced as negligence per se; and in
Sharrar v. Paxson, 171 Pa. 26, Mr. Justice
McCollins declares that "the attempt to
board a movipg train is undoubtedly a
negligent and hazardous act." It is impossible however, to hold that the mere
fact that a train is in any motion, however
slow, would, without regard to other cir-
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cumstances, make the effort to mount it
negligent orreckless. "A car," says Clark
J., "may be moving so slowly that there
would be no apparent danger whatever in
attempting to enter it; so slowly that a person of reasonable prudence, in the exercise
of ordinary care, would not hesitate to
make the effort. It would be a hard rule
thatwould hold a passenger guilty of culpable contributory negligence in such a case."
Stager v. Passenger Railway Co., 119 Pa.
70; Jagger v. Railway Co., 180 Pa. 436. In
Johnson v. W. C. & Phila. R. R. Co., 70
Pa. 357, although the train was in perceptible motion when the passenger, who was
encumbered with a valise, a bundle, and a
coil of pipes, attempted to board it, the decision whether he was. negligent was referred to the jury. In Disher v. Long
Island R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 424, the effort
to get on a car moving at the rate of from
two to three miles per hour was held not
to be negligent per se, in the absence of
circumstances making the act specially
dangerous.-Cf. Briggs v. Union Street
Railway, 148 Mass. 72; Kansas, etc. R. R.
Co. v. Dorough, 72 Texas 108; Foreman v.
Mo. Pacific R. R. Co., 4 Texas Civil App.
54.
But, whether the act of mounting the
train while it was in motion was or was not
negligent is immaterial unless that act
caused the aicident for the damage from
which the plaintiff sues.-Creed v. Pa. R.
R. Co., 86 Pa. 139; Passenger Railway Co.
v. Boudron, 92 Pa. 475; Sharrar v. Paxson,
171 Pa. 26. Roberts had notonlysucceeded
in gaining the lowest step, but he had got
upon the platform. He then received a
blow from the brakeman, and at the same
time the car gave a sudden lurch or jerk.
His fall was caused by the push and the
lurch, and not by the previous and completed act of getting on the car. In Sharrar v. Paxson, supra, Sharrar had succeeded in getting on the step of the x. wving
car, when he was pushed off by tne brakeman. His fall was not the consequence of
the rash act of mounting the car, but of
the brakeman's push.
It may be said that it was the position
of Roberts on the platform of the car,
while in motion, that contributed to the
accident, and that it was negligent in him
to be in this position. It is competent for

the jury to determine that such a position
implies negligence of Roberts, and from
that point of view, it is necessary to consider whether the position on the platform
can properly be deemed the cause of the
accident. Had he been inside the car, it
is evident that this accident would not
have happened. What then? Is the position the cause of the accident? It is
rather a condition of the accident. It is
not the cause thereof. In Passenger Railway Co. v. Boudron, 92 Pa. 475, a passenger was negligently riding on the rear
platform of a street car. He was run into
by the pole of a following car, owing to
the carelessness of its driver. The standing on the platform was a condition, but
not a contributory cause of the accident.
Certain risks a passenger takes on himself, if he stands on the platform, and in
respect to these risks, he is negligent.
Others, he does not take on himself, and
with respect to them, it is not negligent to
stand on the platform. If he were not on
the steps or platform, he could not be
pushed off by the brakeman; but he does
not, by standing on the steps or platform,
assume the risk of being pushed off voluntarily by the brakeman. If he is pushed
off by that servant he may recover damages. Sharrar v. Paxson, 171 Pa. 26. We
do not think he assumes the risk of being
pushed off by the brakeman negligently.
It is not against such a probability that it
is incumbent on him to take the precaution of avoiding the platform.
2. The defendant denies the imputability of the negligent act of the brakeman
to it. We do not think that the imputability can be doubted. The company act.
through its servants. The negligent act
may be that of an engineer, Childs v. Pa.
R. R., 150 Pa. 73; Ellis v. Lake Shore R.
R. 138 Pa. 506, or conductor, or brakeman,
Sharrar v. Parson, 171 Pa. 26; McCloskey
v. R. R. Co. 156 Pa. 254. (coupliig cars,)
Pa. R. R. v. Horst, 110 Pa 226 ; or driver
of another car; Passenger Railway v.
Boudron, 92 Pa. 475; but in all such
cases the company is responsible for the
act.
3. The defendant denies that the evidence would justify an inference of its
negligence. From the fact that the car
lurched or jerked, no inference of negli-
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gence could be made. The act of the
brakeman in striking the body of the
plaintiff with the force with which he is
shown to have struck him, is, unless explained consistently with care, sufficient
evidence of negligence.
We shall submit to ,you therefore the
question of the care or negligence of the
defendant. Although the act of the plaintiff in mounting the train while it was in
motion, might be considered by you to be
negligent, yet, as we fail to see any causal
relation between that act and the accident,
we decline either to pronounce as matter
of law, or to permit you to find, as matter
of fact, that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident.
REMAK vs. QUILTER.
Ejectment.
SHISSLER and WETZEL attorneys for
plaintiff cited: A devise to a person for
the term of his life, and after to his children and their heirs in equal parts; or if he
should die without issue, then over in fee
creates an interest for life with alternate
remainder. 4 Kent 200; Tied. on Real
Prop. .415; Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 139;
Waddel v. Pattem, 5 Rawle 531; Way v.
Gent; 14 S. & R. 40.
Under modern Law a contingent remainder maybe assigned. Harris v. McElroy,
45 Pa. 220; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., Vol. 3,
See. 1271; Bayler v. Commonwealth, 40
Pa. 37.
Strangers to an instrument can not take
advantage of the recitals contained therein. A. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 20,p.
465; Surdertin v. Struther, 45 Pa. 411;
Kirkpatrick v. Heydrick, 161 Pa. 447;
Allen v. Allen. 45 Pa. 468.
Where the law requires a transaction to
be by writing, it cannot be proved by other
evidence. Greenleaf on Evid., Vol. 1, No.
86; Statute of Frauds, Act 22 April, 1856,
No. 4, P. L. 533.
A recital in a deed to a third person is
not such a memorandum as will satisfy
the term of the Statute. Allen v. Alien, 45
Pa. 468.
CLAUDE L. RoTH and WALTER G.

TREIBLY for the defendant.

1. The plaintiff has no title, legal or
equitable, under deed from George Stein.Stewart et al. v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309; Waters'
Appeal, 35 Pa. 523.
2. Defendant has title by deed from
Samuel Stein to Josiah Mintor and subsequent conveyances.-Balliets' Appeal, 14
Pa. 451; in re Nan Mickel, 14 Johns. 324;
Mullaly v. Holden, 123 Mass. 583; Pea-

cock v. Purvis, 2 Brod. and Bing. 362;
Horan v. Weiler, 41 Pa. 470; U. S. Bank
v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 69.
3. Defendant claims title under the
Statute of Limitation. -Innis v. Campbell,
1 Rawle 373; Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa.
51 ; Strinpfler v. Roberts,18 Pa. 283; Trickett on Limitations, Sec. 15, page 12; See. 52,
page 66; See. 107, page 141; Leport v. Todd,
32N. J. L., 124; Brown v. King and
another, 46 Mass. 173; Broad Top Coal Co.
v. Riddlesburg Coal Co., 65 Pa. 435; Altemus v. Long, 4 Pa. 254.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On 3rd December, 1847, Augustus Stein
died, leaving a will which inter alia, devised "all that certain tract of land (- -- )
to my son Samuel for the term of his life,
and after his death to his children and their
heirs in equal parts; if he should die without issue, then to my son George, his
heirs and assigns."
Samuel died in 1857, August 3rd, never
having been married. On January 14,
1853, he conveyed a portion of this tract
to Josiah Mintor in fee. On September
11, 1850, George Stein conveyed the whole
tract to William Armstrong. In 1856,
April 16th, Armstrong ascertaining that
Samuel Stein claimed to have owned the
land in fee by some species of contract
with his father, procured from him a deed
for the land in fee not knowing of his
previous conveyance of a portion of the
tract to Mintor. This deed recited that
"Whereas Augustus Stein did by will of
3rd December, 1847, devise the hereinafter
described tract of land to Samuel Stein
for life; and whereas the said Augustus
Stein had during his lifetime advanced
and transferred the said tract to the said
Samuel, for natural love and affection,"
etc.
By various conveyances from Mintor,
his interest was vested in William Quilter, on August 17, 1889, and that of William Armstrong passed from him by deed
to John Remak, on 17th February, 1880.
Ejeetment by Remak v. Quilter, brought
on September 11, 1895. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for a new trial.
OPINION OF COURT.

The plaintiff in ejectment, must recover,
if at all, upon the goodness of his own
title; not upon the badness of the title of
the defendant. He claims under a deed
from William Armstrong. Armstrong de-
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rived his title through the deed of George
Stein. George Stein's title rests on the
will of Augustus Stein, who devised the
premises "to my son Samuel for the term
of his life, and after his death to his children and their heirs in equal parts, or, if
he should die without Issue then to my
son George, his heirs and assigns." By
this devise, a fee simple was probably
conferred upon Samuel. The parties have
however agreed that he acquired by it
only a life estate. After his death, then
his "children and their heirs" took the
land. He had no children when the will
went into operation or at any later time.
The remainder in them was contingent,
and the contingent event on which it was
to vest never happened. Provision for
this eventuality was made in the will.
Should Samuel die without childrensuch we must assume is the meaning here
of the phrase "if he should die without
issue "-the land was given to George, his
heirs and assigns. There are then alternate remainders, to the children of Samuel, and to George. George Stein then acquired the fee under his father's will. But,
the event on which his remainder vested,
viz. the death of Samuel, childless, happened in 1857. George Stein's deed to
Armstrong was made on Sept. 11, 1850,
seven years before his estate had vested.
Did the remainder to George pass into
Armstrong?
In the earlier law, a contingent remainder was not alienable; Hutchin's W1l
liams Real Property, 422; Stewart v.
Neely, 139 Pa. 309. Equity however recognizes the validity of such conveyances,
William's Real Prop. 423. Where the contingency does not affect the person, "but
the event, where the person is ascertained
who is to take, if the event happens, the
remainder may be granted or devised, and
the grantee or devisee will come into the
place of the grantor or devisor with his
chance of having the estate." 2 Washb.
Real Prop. 562; Robertson v. Wilson, 38
N. H. 48 ; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 96. If one
not having an interest conveys land with
warranty, on the subsequent acquisition of
ownership, it inures to his grantee. He
is estopped from claiming it. And the
estoppel practically carries to the grantee,
thesubsequently acquired interest. Brown

v. McCormick. 6 W. 60.
The Interest of
George Stein has passed to Armstrong.
Primafacie, therefore, Remak, who has
Armstrong's interest, has the right to
recover.
But both the plaintiff and the defendant
claim under Augustus Stein. If he retained the land until his death, it passed
under the devise. If he parted with the
land before his death, the ante-mortem
alienation prevails over the devise, and
one who has derived his title from that
alienation has a better right than one
who claims under the will. William
Quilter is the last grantee. in a series of
conveyances from Josiah Mintor. Mintor
obtained a conveyance in fee, on January
14, 1853, from Samuel Stein. As Samuel
Stein died in 1857, the value of these conveyances depends on his having had a fee
simple. By the will, he obtained, we are
to assume in this case-only a life estate.
If he had a fee simple; he procured it from
his father, Augustus Stein, by some contract of conveyance inter vivos.. Was
there such a contract or conveyance?
No contract or deed is produced. But
Samuel Stein after conveying to Mintor,
in 1853, a portion of the tract, in 1856
conveyed the whole of it to Armstrong.
The deed to Armstrong recites, that Augustus Stein, "had during his lifetime advanced and transferred the said tract to
the said Samuel for natural love and affection." Does this recital dispense with
further proof of this supposititious transfer
to Samuel?
The recital cannot estop John Remak
from denying that transfer. The estoppel
of a deed operates only on one party to it,
in favor of the other party to it. Strangers
cannot be benefitted by it. Sunderlin v.
Struthers, 47 Pa. 411; Kirkpatrick v.
Heydrick, 161 Pa. 447; Franklin v. Dorland, 28 Cal. 175t Deery v. Cray, 72 U.
S. 795; Allen v. Allen, 45 Pa. 468. Remak is a privy of Armstrong, who is the
grantee in the deed containing the recital.
He might be bound by it towards his
grantor, or those claiming by conveyance
subsequently from his grantor.
But
Mintor's deed preceded that to Armstrong.
Mintor could not be bound by the latter.
Neither can he bind Armstrong or his
alienees. Estoppels must be mutual.
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But, a recital in a deed is a declaration.
Like any other declaration it may be employed by anybody to prove the fact
averred in it, against the declarant, or
those who are in privity with him.
Joeckel v. Easton, 11 Mo. 118; Franklin v.
Dorland, 28 Cal. 175; Allen v' Allen, 45
Pa. 468. Samuel Stein, in the deed of 1856
to Armstrong, does declare that to him
had been "advanced and transferred" the
tract in Augustus Stein's lifetime. Anyone, though stranger to this deed, could
employ as against him this declaration as
evidence of the fact. Allen v. Allen, 45
Pa. 468. If it can be employed as such
evidence, against Armstrong, it is because
Armstrong by accepting the deed, is to be
supposed to ssent to the averments in it.
But the slightest reflection shows how
artificial this assumption of assent is, and
how little trustworthy the assent itself
would be. Augustus Stein died in 1847.
Whether he had conveyed his land to
Samuel, Armstrong could not possibly
know. Nor can he be supposed, by accepting the deed, to assert that he knew
or even that he believed that there had
been such a conveyance. His accepting
the deed, would be evidence, of course,
that he thought there might have been
such a conveyance; that he was aware of
the existence of a rumor or allegation that
there had been such a conveyance. But
nothing more. If this deed were his only
ground of claim the assertion of a right to
the land would be an assertion that there
had been a conveyance. But, he already
had one title to the land when he accepted
the deed from Samuel Stein. He is now
claiming the land in virtue of that title.
His acceptance of the deed from Samuel is
fully explained by his knowledge of the
allegation that Samuel had a claim not
founded on the will of his father, and by
his desire to extinguish an outstanding
claim that if it did not impair the one he
already had, would cast a cloud on it. This
is the utmost that his purchase of the
Samuel Stein title, or his acceptance of the
deed with the recital signifies. And, this
is far from being equivalent to a declaration by him that to Samuel Stein had
"been advanced and transferred" the
land. It is only a declaration that it was
alleged; that it was possible, that the land

had been advanced and transferred. As
against Armstrong we do not think that
the declaration implied by his acceptance
of the deed would be primafacie evidence
of the advancement and transfer.
But, the plaintiff is not Armstrong but
Remak. The deed to Remak does not contain any such averment. Two titles had
blended in his grantor, Armstrong, that
under the will of Augustus Stein, and that
under his supposititious antemortem transfer to Samuel. How intensely artificial
the imputation to him of a declaration as
to an act that had taken place, if at all,
prior to 1857, thirty years before he obtained
the conveyance from Armstrong! It is
evident that by accepting a deed in 1886,
he could not have meant to affirm the truth
of the declaration in the deed of 1856. If
he is supposed to have bought the land
from Armstrongon account of Armstrong's
having the Samuel Stein title, the utmost
that hR' can by his act be said certainly to
have averred is that he thought there
might have been a transfer by Augustus
to Samuel Stein, and that it was desirable
to acquire what title, if any, Samuel had.
Surely a third person, stranger to his deed,
and desiring to take advantage of his admissions or declarations from conduct, can
extract from his act nothing stronger than
this. It is hardly necessary to say that we
think this far short of proof of the fact of
the transfer to Samuel. It must berepeated
that there is no estoppel, and that acceptance by Remak of a deed from one in the
deed to whom there was a recital, must receive as an admission by Remak its natural
interpretation.
Let us suppose however, that Remak, by
accepting the deed, did aver that over 40
years before, an act had happened of which
he could have no knowledge, and that that
averment would justify reasonable men in
believing that the event happened. We
say that averment, for there is no other
evidence of the alleged fact. Is it enough
to have thus proved the act of advancing
and transfering to Samuel Stein? Can the
defendant rest on this fact? We think
not. After it is proven that a deed was
made, the deed must be produced, or its
non-production must be accounted for. In
a similar case in which a title by articles
of sale was sought to be established by a
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recital in a deed, that is by the declaration
of the grantor himself, concerning his own
previous conveyance, in an action by the
grantor against others, it is said "The
article should have been produced to speak
for itself, or its loss accounted for before its
contents could be received. There was no
attempt to show its actual existence and
loss, and without this there.was no evidence
on which a recovery could legally be had.
The plaintiff's admission (i.
e. his recital)
was evidence on the point of the eXistence
of the article as a valid instrument, but
this was not enough; its loss and the legal
reason for its non-production was wanting."
Allen v. Allen, 45 Pa. 468. It was the
duty of Quilter, if he wanted to prove his
right to hold the land, to prove (1) that
there had been a conveyance to Samruel
by Augustus Stein; (2) to produce this
conveyance, and prove its execution, or
identify it with the conveyance referred to
in the recital; or, to show a search for it
and the inability to find it, and then to
show its contents by secondary evidence.
There is, therefore, no sufficient evidence
of any conveyance by Augustus Stein to
his son Samuel, and all the titles resting
on that supposed conveyance fail. Had
2emak's title been founded on this conveyance, he could not recover. Under the
will of Augustus Stein, and the conveyance from George Stein and hisgrantee, he
is entitled to recover.
A new trial is refused.
HENRY RITCH vs. ISAAC SANDERS.
Trespass.
MARTIN F. DUFFY and SYLVESTER B.
SADLER for plaintiff.

The violation of a statute constitutes negligence, creating a liability unless excluded
by contributory negligence.-Tobey v. By.,
33 L. R. A. 496; By. v. Voebler, 129 Ill.
54(; Van Norden v. Robinson, 45.Hun. 567;
By. v. Latiner, 128 Ill. 163. Violation of
statute is negligenceper se.-Dahlstrom v.
Rty., 108 Mo.. 5 5; Ry. Co. v. Steigmeir, 118
Ind. 309. There can be a recovery where
no bodily injury was inflicted.-Fitzpatrick
v. Ry., 12 T. C. Q. B. 645; Purcell v. City
Ry. (Minn.), 16 L. R. A. 203; Yeingst v.
y, 167 Pa. 441. Defendant violated a
statute, P. & L. Dig., Vol. 1. p. 2115.
The question of proximate cause is for the
jurv.-Milwauke.e, etc., Ry.Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S.469; L. V. R. R. v. MoKeen, 90
Pa. 122; Baydure v. Knight, 2 W. N. C.
713.

FRANK H. STRouss and HARRY M.
PERSixG for defendant.
Where it is alleged that an injury arose
froir
negligence and the intervening
agency is manifest, it is not error for the
court to withhold the evidence from the
jry.-Behling v. Pipe Lines, 160 Pa. 359;
West Mahanoy v. Watson, 116 Pa. 344.
Injury must be the natural and probable
consequence of the negligence. -Pittsburg
S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 315. Mere
fright is no cause of action. -Ewing et. ux.
v. Pittsburgh C. & C. & St. Louis Ry.Co.,
147 Pa 40; Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 114.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sanders on the 3d day of April, 1890,
discharged a rifle from his yard in the
Borough of Mlt. Holly Springs across an
adjacent common, on which Bitch not
more than 20 yards off was walking, and
in the direction of Bitch. Ritch became
terrified and excited, and symptoms of
mania followed after three days, and have
continued to the present time. This action
is brought against Sanders to recover damages for the injury arising from his reckless and negligent conduct. The damages
assessed are $4,000. At the trial the court
reserved the point of law whether on the
facts alleged by the plaintiffand supported
by the evidence, there could be a recovery.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The counsel for the defendant frankly
concedes that his conduct was reckless
and negligent, as in fact it was. Bitch
but 20 yards off, was walking across the
common, and Sanders discharged his gun
towards him. Besides being reckless, the
act was prohibited by the statute of February 9,1751, 1 Sm. L. 208, which makes
it a misdemeanor for any person in any
borough of the province to "fire any gun
or fire-arm." This statute does not seem
to have been repealed, and it cannot otherwise become obsolete. Homer v. Conimonwealth, 15 W. N. C. 337. A later act,
that of May 8, 1876, 1 P. & 1L. 1162, declares that dischargingagun "at any other
person" shall be a misdemeanor. Both of
these acts are based on the danger to persons in more or less populous places from
the discharge of fire-arms. The last is
founded on the policy not merely of preventing the injury from the impact or
penetration of the bullets that may be discharged, but of preventing the alarm to
which the pointing of a gun towards an-
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other gives rise. To point a gun in the
direction of another, and discharge it, is
fitted to intimidate persons of more than
ordinary firmness of nerve, and, when no
special facts exist, affording a justification for it, is exceedingly reprehensible.
The mania of the plaintiff is the result
of the firing of the gun through the fear
which it engendered. Non-responsibility
for the result may be alleged, on two separate grounds, (1) that no result mediated
by fear is actionable; (2) that this particular result was so unusual and improbable
that it would be improper to visit responsibility for it on Sanders.
(1) Fear was the medium through
which the mania was produced. There are
several caseg that hold that the fear itself,
considereil as an effect, is not a cause of
action. On the other hand numerous cases
maintain responsibility for effects produced
by the fear. In most of them the fear has
been that of a horse. Bitting v. Maxatawney, 177 Pa 213; Baker v. North East Borough, 151 Pa. 234; Pittsburg, etc. Railway
v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306; Mechesney v. Unity
Township, 164 Pa. 358; Wellman v. Borough of Susquehanna Depot, 167 Pa. 239;
McDonald v. Snelling, 96 Mass. 290; Yingst
v. Lebanon, etc. Railway Co., 167 Pa. 437.
In all these cases the fright induced the
disordered and uncontrollable actions of
the horse, which resulted in damage either
to him (Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44) or
to the vehicle, or to the persons in it. But
it is impossible to see why if results
wrought by means of fear, through the
voluntary muscles of the horse, are actionable, results wrought by fear, independent
of these muscles, should not be. In Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218, the death
of a horse from fright, caused by the explosion of a fire-cracker, was a ground for
the recovery of damages from the person
that threw the cracker. It is difficult to
discover why an injury wrought through
the fright of a horse, should be actionable
and that wrought through the fear of a
man not. The celebrated Squib case, Scott
v. Shepherd, 2 Black. 892, implies that if
A causes B, through sudden fear of injury
to himself, to hurl the squib so that it
strike C, A is liable to C for the injury.
It is a little remarkable however that
ome doubt exists whether if the fear

works injury to the individual that suffers
it, otherwise than through his voluntary
muscles, it is a cause of action. If a child
were frightened by X, and impelled by
the fright, fled over a precipice or into a
stream, it would be singular if the actor
could escape responsibility, because the
death resulted through fear operating on
the muscles of the child. But, suppose
the fear operates upon the organism directly ? Is there to be no responsibility
for it?
In Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.
151 N. Y. 107, after stating that fright
alone is no ground for damages, the court
says: IIIf it be admitted that no recovery
can be had for fright, occasioned by the
negligence of another, it is somewhat difficult to understand how a defendant would
be liable for its consequences. Assuming
that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that no recovery can be
had for injuries resulting therefrom. That
the result may be nervous disease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no
way changes the principle." This sentence seems to postulate the principle, that
no effect can be actionable, unless all the
causes of it are actionable. Slight reflection is enough to show the erroneousness
of such a principle. If the mental misapprehension, caused by a fraudulent representation or device, is not actionableper se.,
are we to say that the detrimental action
to which it leads is not actionable? If
A's command to B to commit a tort will
ipsofacto support no action for damages,
are we to conclude that the tort committed by B. in pursuance of it, will support no such action against A? In the.
cases cited supra, the fear of the horse
would have been no cause of action. Did
it follow that the consequences of that
fear had the same immunity?
A for us more serious authority however,
is Ewing v. P. C. etc. Railway Co., 147
Pa. 40. A car was negligently derailed and
thrust against a house in which the plaintiff was. She was thus subjected to great
fright, became sick and disabled, and continued thus sick and disabled. A demurrer
to the declaration was sustained by the
common pleas, and by the supreme court.
The latter court say "there was no allegation that she had received any bodily
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injury. If mere fright, unaccompanied
with bodily injury, is a cause of action, the
scope of what are known as accident cases
will be very greatly enlarged." In this,
it seems to be assumed that the plaintiff
c omplained merely of the fright. But, in
other places of the opinion, a resulting
"permanent injury" is spoken of. Perhaps
the fault with the plaintiffls declaration
was that it did not indicate any specific
physical injury. Several of the authorities cited, simply deny the actionability of
fear, "unaccompanied by an injury to the
person" or "when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." We are unable to infer from anything that is said,
that for a permanent mania produced by the
fear the tortious production of the fear
would not have involved responsibility.
The want of proximateness of the permanent injury, seems at least as much to have
induced the decision as the hypothetical
immunity of an act from liability for the
organic consequences of fear. In Benner
v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, it was held that
the defendant was not liable for the miscarriage of a woman caused by her fright
at the shooting of a dog near her, because
it was not a consequence which the defendant ought to have foreseen. There are on
the other hand respectable authorities
which hold that "the true question would
seem to be whether the fear in which the
plaintiffwas put by the defendant's wrongful or negligent conduct was such as in the
circumstances, would naturally be suffered
by a person of ordinary courage and temper, and such as might thereupon naturally
and probably lead in the plaintiff's case
to the physical effects complained of.
Fear, taken alone falls short of being actual
damage, not because it is a remote or unlikely consequence, but because it can be
proved and measured only by physicad
effects. Pollock Torts, Ed. 1894-p. 57. In
Oliver v. LaValle, 36 Wis. 596; Fitzpatrick
Railway, 12 U. C. Q. B. 645; Purell v. St.
Paul, etc. R. R. Co. 16 L. R. A. 203, a miscarriage caused by terror was held a cause
of action, as in Railway v. Lattimer, 128
Ill. 163, was heart disease. In Buchanan
v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 52 N. J., a
woman, on a platform, to avoid being
struck by a tim6er projecting over it from
a passing car, threw herself upon the floor.

By reason of the shock to her nervous system, occasioned by the peril, her health
was seriously impaired.
The plaintiff
having obtained a verdict, the court,
Beasley, C. J., refused a new trial, saying
however that -it expressed no opinion
whether mere fright resulting in sickness
is actionable.
(2.) Is the consequence too remote to
be within contemplation of a reasonable
man? That Sanders did not anticipate
the result is irrelevant. "For the purpose
of fixing liability for a tort, no inquiry is
permitted into what he (the defendant)
did or did not anticipate." Sedgwick,
Damages, 53; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Pa.
54. The act of Sanders was not one of
negligence. He did not, in aiming at legitimate results, produce others that were
not foreseen. He intended to fire the gun
in the direction of Ritch, and apparently
for the purpose of alarming him, and he
accomplished what he intended. He was
bound to know that his act would probably
excite'great terror, and that the gravest
results might flow from that terror. It is
entirely immaterial whether he thought
that insanity or other permanent injury
would follow. His act was illegitimate,
and for its consequence he must be answerable.
Judgment on the verdict.
ARTHUR FREEMAN vs. ISAAC
WALTON.
Trespass.
ISAIAH SHEELINE and ARTHuR M. DrVALL for plaintiff.
1. Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass.
458; Billings v. Breining, 45 Mich. 65;
McGrath v. N. Y. C.. & i. R. R. R. Co.,
63 N. Y. 522; Briggs v. N. Y. etc., R. R.,
72 N. Y. 26; Knupple v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488; Hanlon v. South
Boston R. R. Co., 129 Mass. 310; Lederman et. ux. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 165 Pa.
118; Davidson v. Traction Co., 4 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 86.
2. Shapleigh v. Wyman, 134 Mass. 118;
Schwartz v. Brahm, 130 Pa. 411; Schmidt
v. McGill, 120 Pa. 405; Murphy v. Orr, 96
N. Y. 14; Moebus v. Hermann, 108 N. Y.
350.
MILES H. MuRR and JOHN G. MILLER
for defendant.
Violation of ordinance is not evidence of
negligence per se. Knupple v. Knicker-
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bocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488; Footman's
right of way at a street crossing is not
superior to that of vehicles. Baker v.
Savage and Gormley, 45N. Y. 191; Betton
v. Baxter et at. 54 N. Y. 245. As to
whether driving at a certain rate of speed
is negligence is for the jury. Bour v.
Plank R. R. 6o., 101 Pa. "334; McCully v.
Clark, 4 Wright 406.
STATE

ENT OF THE CASE.

Isaac Walton resided in the borough of
Tompkinsville, in a. house with three stories On 3rd March, 1896. he made a business trip in a buggy to a point about three
miles from his home. He left his wifeand
a young child, both very sick, in a room on
the second story of the house. They were
unable to walk. Whenj on his return, he
was about I mile from his house, he heard
that it was afire. Excitement and terror
seized hini. Lashing his horse violently,
it ran at the rate of 10 miles an hour through
the principal street of the town. At a crossing he ran into the plaintiff, Freeman, inflicting a lasting damage. This collision
occurred 40 seconds after he received tidings of the condition of his house. There
was an ordinance of the borough that forbade driving through the principal street
at a rate greater than 5 miles an hour.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
The plaintiff requests us to give you
several instructions. He desires that we
should say that the breach of the ordinance
was conclusive of negligence by the defendant. The cases are numerous which hold
that when ordinances made to protect citizens from accident, are violated, the violation is evidence of negligence. Thus, the
transgression of an ordinance regulating
the speed of cars, Hanlon v. South Boston
Horse R. R. Co., 129 Mass. 310; Lederman
v. R. R., 165 Pa. 118; Pennsylvania Co. v.
James, 81J Pa. 194; of an ordinance requiring a railroad Co., to maintain a flagman
at street crossings, McGrath v. N. Y. etc.,
R. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 522; of an ordinance
forbidding allowing stove pipes to project
without the building, Briggs v. N. Y. etc.
R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 26; of an ordinance
forbidding leaving horses in the street unhitched, Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 84 N.Y. 488, has been deemed evidence
of negligence. Precisely why, does not
distinctly appear. The ordinance cannot

make the act negligent, which is not such,
Phila. & Reading R. R. v. Ervin, 89 Pa.
71; Phila. & Reading R. R. v. Boyer, 97
Pa. 91; Davidson v. Traction Co., 4 Sup.
C., 86. In Phila. & Reading R. R. v.
Ervin, 89 Pa. 71, the relevancy of the
ordinance is said to consist in its inducing
less vigilance on the part of the plaintift,
who with reason, assumes that the defendant will not ignore it. It can scarcely be
thought that the ordinance is admissible
as expressive of the opinion of the law
making power, as to what careful and
prudent conduct is. At all events, the
proof of the ordinance is admissible. But,
it is not conclusive. Cases supra. You
may consider the ordinance with the other
facts, in determining whether Walton was
negligent, in driving at the rate of ten
miles per hour, through the chief street of
the borough of Tompkinsville. You must
not determine that that rate was negligent, simply because it exceeded the rate
of five miles prescribed as the maximum
by the municipal regulation.
The plaintiff further desires us to inform
you that the speed to be observed at a crossing, must be regulated not by the necessities of the defendant, but by a consideration
of the danger to others using the street. It
is almost aphoristic to say that persons
driving horses and vehicles through the
streets, must take heed to the risks to persons crossing the street, even elsewhere
than at the crossings. Moebus v. Herrman,
108 N. Y. 349; a fortiori at the crossings,
Murphy v. Orr, 96 N. Y. 14; Schwartz v,
Brahm, 130 Pa. 411; Schmidt v. McGill,
120 Pa. 405. Even the ordinary rate of a
horse-car "ought to be checked at every
street crossing, especially after dark." West
Philadelphia, etc. Railway v. Mulhair, 6
W. N. C. 507. If the speed of 10 miles an
hour exceeds that which comports with a
prudent and careful regard of the safety of
pedestrians using the street, it will be
your duty to render a verdict for the plaintiff unless the matters now to be considered are countervailing.
The same external act, under the same
external circumstances, may be negligent
or not, according to the subjective condition of the actor, Eg. The heedlessness
of a very young child will not be imputed
to it as negligence, while a similar state
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in an adult will.

Summers v. Brewing

ley v. L. & Y. Railroad Co., 13 Q, B. D.

131. Walton had no right *ilfully to run
Co., 143 Pa. 114. This is one of the exceptions to the principle that the standard of over Freeman in order to save his house, his
the duty of care does not vary with individ- wife, or his child from damage however
ual ability. Pollock Torts, Ed. 1894, p. 540.
grave. We think however that he is liable
not for the collision, but for the negligent
In sudden and critical danger the mind is
not able to exercise its usual circumspeccausation of the collision, and in determintion, and the absence of the circum- ing whether he was negligent, in fast driving, regard may be had to the recency of
spection is not then negligence. A man
his information concerning the condition
in the face of grave peril is not negligent
because the same acts in the absence of of his house, the excitement produced by
it, and the effect of that excitement on his
such peril would be rash and ill-advised.
Brown v. French, 104 Pa. 604. This prin- actions. If the ordinarily careful man,
ciple is frequently applied when the at- under the circumstances would have been
excited to the same degree and would have
tempt of a defendant, in an action against
him for his negligence, is to fasten on the driven at the same rate, the act is not to
plaintiff the charge of having contributed
be adjudged negligent. No allowance is
to the injury by his own negligence *however to be made for his idiosyncracies.
Nature has not conferred on all men the facSprouls v. Morris Township, 179 Pa. 219;
ulties that, together, constitute care, memVallo v. U. S. Express Co., 147 Pa. 404;
ory, imagination, quickness of thought,
Baker v. North East Borough, 151 Pa. 234;
Stoughton v. Manuf. Nat. Gas Co., 159 Pa. imperturbableness, control over the muscles, the power of appreciating the adapted64.
ness of the act done to the end that ought
The cases are not so numerous in which
the peril of the defendant is held to take to be xccomplished. But the law does not
permit them to transfer to others, the hurt
from his acts, the character of negligence
as being which in ordinary circumstances or damage which these defects of constithey would be justly stigmatized. The tution occasion. Society is not a mutual
insurance company and the apostolic
Squib case, Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Blacks.
892, 1 Smith's L. (. 737, i a famous speci- maxim "bear ye one anothers' burdens" is
men of this class. A majority of the judges not a maxim of Anglo-American jurisprudence. If the ordinarily self-possessed
there decided that when A threw a lighted
and careful man would not have driven
squib into a market house, which lighted
at the speed of 10 miles an hour, the peril
on B's stall, and B threw it impulsively on
to house, child and wife, which Walter
C's stall, and C threw it and struck D in
the eye, B and 0 were not responsible, but
was attempting to avert was no excuse
from the consequences of that speed. The
only A. In Donahue v. Kelley, 181 Pa.
93, the defendant who, attempting to second request of the plaintiff we therefore
carry out of the house a burning gasoline adopt, with the addition that if the ordilamp, and being burned by the fluid es- narily prudent and careful man would
caping from the lamp, hurled it through have adopted the speed of 10 miles an hour
the room toward the door in such a way under the circumstances, the adoption of
it is not imputable to Walter as negligence,
that it exploded and scattered the burning
gasoline over the plaintiff was not to be and for its consequences he is not readjudged negligent by the standard of care
sponsible.
The defendant contends that the plainthat would have been applicable under
less urgent circumstances. Cf. Floyd v.
tiff has not shown that he acted carefully
Phila. &. Read. R. R. Co., 162 Pa. 29; in crossing the street, and that had he so
acted, the accident would not have hapSekerak v. Jutt, 153 Pa. 117.
A man has no right deliberately to re- pened. There are states in which it is inlieve himself of a hurt at the expense of
cumbenton him to show that he exercised
his neighbor. He cannot, e. g. save his
care. rn Pennsylvania, no one is presumed to have been careless. The plainstructure from injury by water that has
accumulated on his premises by conduct- tiff must prove the carelessness of
ing it on the land of his neighbor. Whal- the defendant. The defendant must
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prove the contributory carelessness of
the plaintiff unless the plaintiff himself proves it. Bradwell v. Railway
Co., 139 Pa. 404. In the absence of evidence, the law presumes that the plaintiff
did all the acts required of a prudent man;
Schum v. Pa. R. R., 107 Pa. ,8; Pollock"
Torts, Ed. 1894, p. 548. It is true, that
there are cases in which the occurrence
which is the ground of the plaintiff's
claim, is held to imply a want of care on
his part. BRes ipsa loquitur Thus if
one is struck by a locomotive, in crossing
a track, the accident itself is said to prove
that he must either have neglected to stop,
look, and listen, or have risked crossing
it, despite his knowledge of the approach
of the train. But while with respect to
crossings over railroads, the courts have
devised the principle that the traveler
must stop, look, and listen, there is no
such legal duty on the part of a pedestrian
about to cross a street with respect to ordinary vehicles. Schmidt v. McGill, 120
Pa. 405; Moebus v. Herrman. 108 N. Y.
349; Shapleigh v. Wyman, 134 Mass. 118;
Schienfeldt v. Norris, 115 Mass. 17: Bowser
v. Wellington, 126 Mass. 391. And the
fact that a passenger is run into by a
horse and wagon is not ipso facto, evidence that he was negligent. The horse
is; ordinarily, under control. The pedestrian has a right to assume that he will be
seen, and that the driver will either
slacken his pace, or turn sufficiently to
avoid striking him. He is not absolved
from the exercise ofcare, but care cannot be
rigorously and inflexibly defined in his
case, as respects the horse and wagon, as
with regard to cars impelled by steam. It
is not the duty of a pedestrian to anticipate recklessness or carelessness on the
part of those who are driving on the
streets. Pollock, Torts, Ed. 1894, p. 591.
In our opinion, there is an entire absence
of evidence which could legitimate the
imputation of negligence to the plaintiff.
SAMUEL BURKE vs. JOHN LOOMIS.
Assumpsit.
LLEWELLYN HILDRETH and ALBERT
T. MORGAN for plaintiff.
From an acknowledgment of a debt, the

law implies a promise to pay it.

Trickett

on Limitations, p. 307; Palmer v. Gillespie, 95 Pa. 340. The amount of the debt
need not be stated.
Hazelbaker v.
Reeves, 12 Pa. 264; Davis v. Steiner, 14
Pa. 275. Payment of interest or part payment of note is sufficient acknowledgment.
Barkley's Appeal, 64 Pa. 69; Adams v.
Seitzinger, 1 W. & S. 244; Sigourney v.
Drury, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 387; James v.
Moore, 5 Binney, 573.
CLEON N. BERNTHEIZEr and ELI SALISBURY for defendant.
The acknowledgment of a debt must
refer plainly to the very debt to whose exemptionfromthe statutory bar it is sought
to be applied. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 41 Pa.
51; Burr v. Burr, 26 Pa. 284. The acknowledgment from which the promise is
inferred must be consistent with a promise to pay. Senseman v. Hershman, etc.,
82 Pa. 83 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 14 S. & R. 194.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Loomis on 3d March, 1877, made a note
payable five years after date to Burke for
$572. A series of payments, 20 in number,
by Loomis, was made during 1882-1894,
amounting altogether to $213, none of the
payments being more than enough at the
time it was made to pay the then accrued
interest. When the last payment was
made Loomis said to Burke, "I don't expect to pay you anything more." In
March, 1895, he, however, paid $11 to
Burke on account of indebtedness.
At
that time Burke held a second note against
him for $300, made on 7th June, 1892, and
payable one year from date. There remains
due on the note of 3d March, 1877, the
principal,$200 of interestdown to March 3d,
1894, and all the interest from 1894 to the
present time.
Defendant pleads the statute of limitations.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In March, 1895, Burke held two notes
of Loomis', one dated 3dMarch,1877, and
payable five years thereafter and. the
other 3d June, 1892, payable one year from
its date. The payment of $11 made by
Loomis at that time, was "on account of
indebtedness." The debtor did not specify
the debt. While he admitted some debt,
the admission would be satisfied by the
debt of 1892 as well as by that of 1877.
Such an admission is not sufficient to toll
the statute of limitations with respect to
the debt of 1877. Burr v. Burr, 26 Pa. 284;
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Landis v. Roth, 109 Pa. 621, Limitations,

ment is relied on, the fact,, the time, of

355.
In 1894 a payment was made. Itsamount
is unknown. It was less however than
the interest then due. Does this payment
so acknowledge the note in suit, as to exempt it from the bar of the statute? We
think not, and for two reasons. (1.) In
the first place, it has the same defect, from
this point of view, as the payment of
March, 1895. There were then two debts
due, and there is no evidence to which of
them Loomis intended it to be applied.
We may infer that Burke applied it to the
note of 1877, Watt v. Hoch, 25 Pa. 411;
but his lapplication of it, not concurred in
by Loomis, could "not take the debt out
of the statute as to the balance," Tiedeman
Sales, 212. (2.) In the second place, the
payment of 1894 was accompanied by the
declaration "I don't expect to pay you
anything more." A payment is an acknowledgment of the debt. But, the acknowledgment does not ipsofacto toll the
bar of the statute. It produces this effect,
only through the promise to pay the debt
which is inferred from the acknowledgment, when the inference is not by some
other fact repelled. When words or acts
accompanying the acknowledgment are
inconsistent with the purpose to pay the
debt in the future, the acknowledgment
will not toll the statute. Heany v.
Schwartz, 155 Pa. 154; Limitations, 311 et
seq. The payment of 1895 does acknowledge the debt, to the extent of the payment, but the words "I don't expect to
pay you anything more" indicates a
denial that any debt would remain to be
paid, or at least, a purpose not to pay it.
Do any of the prior payments toll the
statute? Twenty payments in all were
made prior to 1895. Of these we have already considered the last made in 1894.
The times at which the other nineteen
were made do not appear from the evidence. If any of them had been made in
1892, or 1891, it would have exempted the
debt from the bar of the statute of limitations. But, a payment made before 1891
could not have this effect, the action having been brought in the beginning of 1897.
When a debt is prima facie barred, it is
incumbent on the plaintiff to establish the
facts that will remove this bar. If pay-

the payment of the debt to which it is applied must be shown. There is then
nothing in this case to relieve the plaintiff's claim from the prohibition against
enforcement, offered by the statute of limitations. Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of the jury, must be for the defendant.
SAMUEL ROSE vs. AHAB WALKER.
Assumpsit.
CHAS. R. WEEKS and ADAI HERMAN
for plaintiff.
A principal is not liable for a fraudulent
representation by an agent beyond the
apparent scope of his authority. Atlas
Mining Co. v. Johnston, 23 Mich. 36;
White v. Cooper, 3 Barr 130; Hirshfield v.
Waldron, 54 Mich. 649; Mackintosh v.
Eliot Nat. Bank, 123 Mass. 393. The third
party must use reasonable diligence to
guard against any fraudulent acts of the
agent. Chase v. Buhl Iron Works, 55
Mich. 139; Rice v. Peninsular Club, 52
Mich. &7.
J. PERRYWOOD and J. THomxsoN OA.DWELL

for defendant.

The authority of an alleged agent may
be established by the circumstances of the
case. Woodwell v. Brown. 5 Pa. 333.
The possession of the note by an agent
implies authority to receive payment.
Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Law v.
Stokes, 32 N. J. L. 249; Butler v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298. Payment to a thief will
discharge the maker if made without
knowledge of the theft and with reasonableprudence. Byleson Bills, 5 Ed. pg. 351.
Plai tiff's negligence invited the forgery,
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253; Byles on
Bills, 6 Ed. pg. 490.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Rose, on the 7th March, 1892, loaned
$1,000 to Walker, receiving from Walker a
note under seal for that sum, payable in
one year from date, with 7 per cent. interest. Rose, who was crippled and partially
blind, employed his son Charles to attend
to many matters of business. He never,
however, allowed him to make collections
except on his written authority. Rose's
notes and securities were kept in a tin box
in the house, Vvhich was ordinarily not
locked, and the key of which Samuel Rose
carried. On Aug. 13th, '93, the Walker
note not being paid, Rose requested his
son to call on Walker and ascertain when
he would be ready to pay it. The son,
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Charles, without Samuel Rose's knowledge, went upstairs to the box, opened it,
and took from it the Walker note. He
also wrote the following:
"MR. AHAB WALKER,

Dear Sir :-I send my son, Charles, with
your note for $1,000. I am anxous to receive the money and interest, and shall be
obliged if you will pay them to him.
Truly yours,
SAMUEL ROSE."
The body of the note was written in the
style of letter ordinarily made by Charles,
but the words Samuel Rose very skillfully
imitated the usual signature of Samuel
Rose, which was well known to Walker.
The imitation indeed was so close that it
might have imposed on a very sagacious
and experienced judge of handwriting.
The money, $1,061, was paid by Walker,
and the note with the above order were
left with him. When the son returned he
informed his father that Walker had declined to pay the note. He drew up another note in the exact form of the Walker
note, wrote the name of Ahab Walker to
it, and placed it in the tin box. After
some weeks, Samuel Rose, assuming that
the note was unpaid, sent for an attorney, and producing the forged Walker
note, delivered it to him with a request
thathesue it out. This action ofassumpsit
declaring on the note of 7th March, 1892,
is the consequence.
When the plaintiff put the note in evidence, its execution was duly proved by
the plaintiff and his son Charles. In defense, the defendant proved that it was a
forgery, and produced the genuine note.
Plaintiff convinced, stated to the court
that that was the note on which he should
insist on recovering. He proved that his
son had delivered it to defendant under
the circumstances above recited. The
court directed a verdict for defendant.
Motion for new trial.
OPINION OF COURT.

Ahab Walker resists the demand of Samuel Rose on the ground that he has already
paid the note on which the suit is brought.
He has in fact paid it. Buthe has paid it,
not to Samuel Rose, but to Charles Rose.
It needs no authority tojustify the assertion
that a payment to Charles has not the legal
consequence of a payment to Samuel Rose,
unless in some way Charles was for the

purpose of receiving payment the agent of
Samuel.
Charles pretended to Walker to be the
agentofSamuel. But an agency can neither
be created nor proved by the declaration of
the pretending agent made to the person
with whom he dealsor to others. Neither
can his act, as agent, prove the agency.
I'It is the conduct of the principal, and not
of the agent, from which authority must
be inferred." Huffeut, Agency, 142, 143.
Did Samuel constitute Charles his agent
to receive payment from Walker? Hedid
not. He simply requested Charles to call
on Walker and ascertain when Walker
would be able to pay it. This is far from
being an authority to carry the note to
Walker, to deliver it to him and to receive
the money due upon it.
But, a man may by a course of conduct
estop himself from denying as against X,
that one with whom X has dealt as agent
was in fact such. We must then inquire
whether the facts of this case estop Samuel
Rose from denying, as against Walker, the
authority of Charles Rose.
The relation of father to Charles, it need
scarcely be said, does not preclude the denial of this authority by Samuel Rose. But
Charles had attended to many matters of
business. If these had been with Walker, and had included receipt of payment
of notes, Walker might have been justified
in assuming that the authority to receive
payment of' the note in suit existed in
Charles. But, neither the kind of affairs
performed by Charles, nor any participation therein of Walker appears. Onthecontrary it distinctly appears that the plaintiff never allowed his son to make collections except on written authority. We are
to presume, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that Charles never did make
collections except underwritten authority.
It is not apparent whether Walker was
aware of the previous collections made by
Charles; but, if he was, we must assume
that he was also aware that each of them
was made under a special written delegation from the plaintiff to make it.
He
knew then, that there was no general authority to collect; that for each collection
there had been particular deputation, and
that each particular deputation had been
in writing.
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Walker then knew from the previous conduct of the plaintiff, as be would know independently of such conduct, that Charle.q
had no power to receive the money unless
he had been specially authorized. When
he took Charles' word that he had the autbority, he acted at his peril. It matters
not whether the word was oral or written,
nor whether it pretended to be Charles' or
Samuel's word. It was in fact Charles',
Samuel is not responsible for it. It was a
forged power of attorney for the imposition
by means of which no consequences can
fall on Samuel. Penna. Co. v. Franklin
Fire Ins. Co., 181 Pa. 40. That the forgery
was skillfully executed, so skillfully as to
elude the experts, can surely not make
Samuel chargeable with its results. Is he
to be blamed for permitting his son to become familiar enough with his handwriting to imitate it, or to acquire skill
enough to imitate it?
But Charles' possession, at the interview with Walker, of the note, tended to
authenticate Charles' pretension that he
had been sent by his father to collect it.
Is his father, however, responsible for
that?
He did not give the note to
Charles; he did not intend Charles to
have it; he was not aware that Charles
had it. If he is to be charged with the
act of Charles, it must be because he did
not keep his tin box locked, or adopt some
other precaution against access to its contents. But is a man obliged to suspect
that his son will act improperly with respect to his securities, and to prohibit
his getting them into his hands? And if
he does not, and the son acts, as in this
case, is lie then to be compelled to bear the
consequences? However negligent, as to
strangers, the leaving of the securities
in an unlocked box may have been, it
was surely not negligence, as to the son.
The father is not required to suspect his
sonu-in the absence of previous indications of depravity, of being a rogue or a
thief. In Penna. Co. v. Franklin Ins. Co.,
181 Pa. 40. Baker had given the key of the
box in which his securities were to his son.
He had authorized him to collect the income from many of these securities. The
son possessed himself of some of these securities, certificates of stock in an insurance
company, forged a power of attorney in his

father's name to make a transfer of them;
transferred them, and caused the insurance
company to cancel the old and issue a new
certificate to the transferee. The company
was held liable to the father. Cf. Hill v.
Jewett Publishing Co., 154 Mass. 172;
Merchants of theStaple of London v. Bank
of England, 21 Q. B. D. 160; Bank of Ireland v. Trustees of Evans Charities, 5 H.
L. C. 389. The doctrine of these English
cases is, that although the plaintiff may
have been negligent, and but for his negligence the defendant would not have been
imposed on, yet the plaintiff will not be
chargeable with this result unless the negligence was the proximate cause of the imposition. Merely leaving the seal of a
corporation unguarded, in the custody of a
clerk does not make the corporation liable
for his fraudulent application of it to
whalt purported to be its power of attorney.
We are not able to see any negligence of
Samuel Rose at all, so far as the deplorable
result of the dishonesty of his son is concerned. It was not negligence to have
occasionally employed him to make collections under a written power. It was not
negligence to have sent him with the message to Walker. It was not negligence
to have omitted precautions against a
roguish use of his securities by his son.
Theloss of the defendant is the consequence
of the falsehood, the forger.v, and the unauthorized possession of the note by Charles.
His acts cannot be imputed to his father.
Walker owed the note to the plaintiff. It
is his misfortune that he paid it to Charles
Rose, under the mistaken supposition that
he was directed by Samuel Rose to do so.
For the mistake Samuel cannot be deprived of the money due him. The court
was in error in directing a verdict for the
defendant. It should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The rule for a new
trial is therefore made absolute.
SARAH JANE KAHL vs. ZWENGLI
KAIL.
Feigned issue.
G. FRANK WETZEL and FRANK J.
LAUBENSrEIN for T. F. Brunart.
The property is subject to oth executions.-Watmough v. Francis, 7 Pa 206.
Sale after return day is valid.-3 Liens
507. Executions delayed by permissive or
collusive assent or by gross laches, lose
their priority.-Earl's Appeal, 13 Pa.
483; Schuylkill Co.'s Appeal, 30 Pa. 3.58;
Wier v. Hale, 3 W. & S. 285.
CiHARLES S. SHALTERS and CLARENCE
R. GILLILAND for Sarah Jane Kahl.

Sale may be made after the return day.
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St. Bartholomew's Church v. Wood, 61
Pa. 913; 3 Liens 507. The lien of the levy
is not lost by the delay of the sheriffElectric Co.'s Appeal, 180 Pa. 150. The
proceeds go to the first execution-creditor.
-Shafner v. Gilmore, 3 W. & S. 438. It
would have been irregular to issue an
alias ft. fa.-Pott's Appeal, 20 Pa. 255.
And it was unnecessary to payuny money
into court.-MecDonald v. Todd, 1 Grant's
Cases 17.
OPINION OP THE COURT.

On March 1st, 1895, P. F. Brungart obtained ajudgment for $350 against Zwingli
Kahl and J. Adam Kahl.
Sarah Jane
Kahl obtained ajudgment against Zwingli
Kahl, who was her husband, on Jan. 17th,
1897, for $1800.
On this judgment she issued an execution to May term 1897, and
a levy was at once made thereon, on Feb.
11th, 1897, upon all the personal property
of Zwingli K-ihl. The May term ended on
May 17th11897. On May 27th, 1897, Brungart issued an execution to the September
term and directed the sheriff to proceed at
once. On June 11th, 1897, the sheriff sold
the personalty of Zwingli Kahl under the
execution levied on the Sarah J. Kahl
judgment, she becoming the purchaser.
He made no levy tunder the Brungartfi.
fa., nor did he sell upon it. Although
Mrs Kahl paid no money to the sheriff,
insisting on crediting on her judgment,
the amount bid by her, the court is to consider the money in court, and is to determine whether Mrs. Kahl or P. F. Brungart
is entitled to it.
Judgments do not become leins upon
personalty, but executions do. And they
rank as liens, not according to the age of
the judgments on which they are founded,
but according to the order in which they
reach the hands of the sheriff. 1 Liens,
324; 3 Liens, 499. The money made on a
sale under both is to be applied, first, to
the earlier, and then to the later ft. fa.
The Sarah J. Kahlf!. fa., was the first in
the sheriff's hands and it was promptly
levied. But the sale did not take place
until June 11, 1897, which was after the
return day of the writ. It is well settled
however, that the lien of thefi. fa., is not
lost, because of a delay beyond the return
day in rmaking the sale, if a levy was made
before the return day. 1 Liens, 341: 3
Liens, 507.
Four months elapsed between the levy
on thef!.fa. and the sale. Doesthisdelay
per se impair the lien of the fi.fa.f If it
was the result of the sheriff's tardiness or
neglect, it would not have that effect. 1
Leins, 354; Keller v. Beishline, 1 0. C.
287; Gillespie v. Keating, 180 Pa. 150;
MeGinnes v. Prieson, 85 Pa. 116; Broadhead v. Cornman, 171 Pa. 322.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Kahl, was the wife
of the defendant, and it is urged that her
evident object in issuing the execution, was

not to sell the goods of her husband, but
to impose a lien on them, that, should any
other person issue afi.fa. would secure to
her the proceeds of a sale. It is entirely
clear that one who issues an execution
with the intent that it shall not be executed in due course, and who manifests
this intent by suggestion or direction to
the sheriff, postpones himself to other intervening executions. 1 Liens, 343; 3
Liens, 505. But he must both have and
express to the sheriff this intent. What
is the evidence of such intent on the
part of Mrs. Kahl?- The writis itself a
command to the sheriff to make the
money. There is no express evidence that
any contradictory direction to that oflicer
accompanied it. We might surmise that
the wife was not anxious for a sale of her
husband's property, but she cannot be deprived of her priority, on account of a suspicion that she had given secret monition to the sheriff not to be too hasty.
Perhaps her inaction, during the four
months, gives an appreciable strength to
that suspicion but it still remains, we
think, too feeble to justify the postponement of the execution. If the sheriff's
delay is caused by the acts of the plaintiff
he nmay lose his priority. 1 Liens, 347; but
the "sheriff's procrastination, even with
the sufferance of the creditor, it has been
said, will not postpone an execution to
later ones which are executed more expeditiously." 1 Liens, 354. We are unable to infer from the interval of four
months between levy and sale, and from
the wifehood of the plaintiff, that that
delay was due to a secret direction from
her.
But, thus to decide is, we think, unnecessary to justify the appropriation of the
sheriff's sale to Mrs. Kahl's ft. fa. That
fi. fa. gave authority to make the sale.
The sale was made under it. The money
thus produced is payable to Mrs. Kahl,
unless some one has a superior right. Mr.
Brungart has such right, if it all, only because the sale was made by his writ, as
well as by that of Mrs. Kahl. Nothing is
better settled than that no creditor can
share in the product of an execution sale,
unless his execution was one of the instruments of the sale. Even an earlier ft. fa,
loses a right to participate in the proceeds
of the sale, if no levy was made on it, and
the sale did not take place upon it. 3
Liens, 508; 1 Liens, 356. It is quite clear
then, that if no levy and sale take place on
the laterf. fa. it could not take the proceeds of a sale made on the earlier. Were
this not clear, it would be manifest that
suchfi. fa. could not take the money in
preference .to the earlier. No levy was
made under the Brungart fi. fa. and the
sale did not take place upon it. He therefore has no locus standi to object to the
appropriation of the money to M8rs. Kahl.
The money will therefore be paid to her.

